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CASE NOTES
Attorneys - Power of a Court To Establish a Scale for Attorneys' Fees.
-The justices of the New York Appellate Division, First Department, adopted
a special rule for attorneys within the First Department, establishing a scale of
fees for lawyers' services in personal injury suits and wrongful death actions. It
also required the filing of a closing statement with the court, and provided for
the award of additional compensation in the discretion of the court. Plaintiffs,
who were themselves attorneys, contested the power of the court to enact such
a rule. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, held, granted. In the absence
of statutory or constitutional authority, a court is without power to enact or
enforce a rule establishing a scale for attorneys' fees. Gair v. Peck, 6 Misc. 2d
739, 165 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
The attorney's contingent fee has been censured for years because of the
excesses to which it has so often been carried.' In New York, the measure of
an attorney's compensation has been the subject of agreement, express or implied,
between the attorney and client since statutes and regulations controlling fees
were discarded in 1848.2 Prior to 1848, and as early as 1658, when Governor
Stuyvesant, with "some legislative or executive authority,"3 created New York's
first tariff of attorneys' fees, an attorney's compensation had been prescribed by
state regulation. Under the English system, the same control was generally
exercised by the judiciary. 4 Thus, the legislature and not the judiciary controlled
the fees of lawyers in New York from the beginning. However, the Code of
Civil Procedure in 1876 incorporated the provision that "the compensation of an
attorney or counsellor is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is
not restrained by law." 6 This clause was made a part of the present Judiciary
Law.7
Concerning the power of the appellate division to enact and enforce a rule
setting a scale for contingent fees, 8 the court could find no New York case in
1. Burling v. King, 46 How. Pr. 452 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1874); Buckley v. Surface
Transp. Corp., 277 App. Div. 224, 98 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1st Dep't 1950); Ruiz v. Sistman, I
A.D.2d 806, 149 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st Dep't 1956). For general survey of the problem in New
York see Comment, Lawyer's Tightrope-Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 Cornell L.Q. 683 (1956).
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, c. 379, § 258.
3. 1 Chester, Courts and Lawyers of New York 143 (1925).
4. Ibid. See also People ex. rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 476, 162 N.E. 487, 491

(1928).
5. With the exception that counselors were limited only with regard to contingent fees,
there being no general restraint upon their contracts.
6. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 66 (1876).
7. "The compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law .... " N.Y. Judiciary Law § 474.
8. It was agreed that the necessity, fairness or desirability of the rule was not to be
discussed. The new rule 4 is entitled "Contingent Fees in Claims and Actions for Personal
Injury and Wrongful Death" and generally it established a scale of fees to be strictly followed
except where the court, upon review of the particular circumstances, allows deviation. It
provides that the receipt or retention of fees in excess of the schedule shall constitute the
exaction of unconscionable fees in violation of Canons 12 and 13 unless allowed by the court
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point, but noted and discussed the opinions expressed in two other jurisdictions.
In Shannon v. Cross,9 the Supreme Court of Michigan declared invalid a circuit
court's rule requiring that, where a plaintiff could not produce security for costs,
his attorney should file an affidavit to the effect that he bad not bargained for a
division of or share in the judgment sought. It was held that the rule inhibiting
the right of contract of the parties, was more a substantive than a procedural
enactment, and was a usurpation by the judiciary of a legislative function. In
Tatcher v. Industrial Comm'n,'0 the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the right
of the legislature to grant the industrial commission the authority to fix attorneys' fees in compensation proceedings, but in its opinion clearly pronounced
the view that no correlative power existed concurrently in the judiciary. The
present court took note of the fact that statutes operative in those jurisdictions
were verbatim with the corresponding provisions of section 474 of the New York
Judiciary Law," the basis of the plaintiffs' claim in the present case.
The basic contention of the defendant justices was that the adoption and
enforcement of the new rule was merely a proper exercise of their powers and
disciplinary duties as defined and granted by sections 831 and 90(2)13 of the
Judiciary Law. However, Justice Stevens, in his opinion, rebutted this contention by noting that section 83 expressly limits the special rules which the
appellate division in any one department may adopt to those not inconsistent
with any statute or rule of practice. Since rule 4 is inconsistent with the obvious
intent of the legislature in section 474, authorizing attorneys to contract for
their fees, unrestrained by law, the court argued that the power to enact and
enforce rule 4 is not granted by section 83.
Furthermore, the court, recognizing the distinction between disciplinary powers
and those prescriptive or regulatory, found that the only power over attorneys
granted the appellate division under section 90(2) was disciplinary, while the
evident function of the new rule was to prescribe or regulate in advance. The
in its discretion. In all cases the attorney must file a closing statement with the clerk of the

appellate division. Special Rules Regulating the Conduct of Attorneys and Counelors-at-Law
in the First Judicial Department, Rule 4.
9. 245 Alich. 220, 222 N.W. 163 (1928).
10. 115 Utah 56S, 207 P2d 178 (1949).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. "A majority of the justices of the appellate division in the four departments, by joint
order of the four presiding justices or justices presiding, shall have the power, from time to
time, to adopt, amend or rescind any rule of civil practice, not inconsistent .ith any statute;
and a majority of the justices of the appellate division in each department, by order of such
majority, shall have power, from time to time, to adopt, amend or rescind any special rule for
such department not inconsistent with any statute or rule of cvil practice." N.Y. Judiciary
Law § 83.
13. "The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys and cousellors-atlaw and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law, and the appellate division of the
supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove
from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud ... or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice... !'N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(2).
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New York Court of Appeals had said in Matter of Fitzsimons,14 that whether
fraud or undue advantage has been perpetrated can be established in New York
only after ". . . the question has been fully and fairly investigated. . . .The
statute [now Judiciary Law section 474] conferred upon the parties the right to
make the contract, and conferred upon the court no authority to make it for
them." Obviously then, the present court argued, the disciplinary power under
section 90(2) is capable of exercise only ex post facto, not before the unconscionable fee is charged, and that in the absence of fraud or other professional
misconduct, the rights of an attorney to contract for his fee are not to be
governed in advance by the powers of the appellate division under section 90(2),
but by section 474.
Defendants noted that"... the sole question here is whether the Court may
advise the Bar in advance of its standards and relieve lawyers of the threat of
impairment of their professional standing by an ex post facto determination,' 1
and relied on Erie County Water Authority v. Western New York Water Co.,10
where the New York Court of Appeals stated that the appellate division
"... has exclusive jurisdiction to say what constitutes professional misconduct
on their [lawyers'] part."
The present court attempted to distinguish this by indicating that in the
Erie County case the misconduct had already occurred, and that the Court of
Appeals merely reaffirmed a long standing position on the authority of the
appellate division to discipline. The court would not agree with the contention
of the defendant justices that their power to discipline included the power to
set, in advance, standards of professional conduct regarding contingent fees, 17
notwithstanding the fact that the court has heretofore established in advance
such standards in other respects.' s
At first blush the court may seem to have fully and fairly decided the issue of
the case. There are, however, further points, which, when considered in the
historical context from which the question of judicial power to regulate attorneys'
fees has arisen, would lead to a contrary judgment. It has been suggested19 that
the 1848 statute,20 the prototype of section 474 of the Judiciary Law, may be
14. 174 N.Y. 15, 23-24, 66 N.E. 554, 557 (1903). A similar view was adopted by the
court in Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 526, 78 N.E. 179, 181 (1906),
where the court said that ". . . the mere fact that the attorney under the agreement was to
receive one-half does not render it unconscionable, unless it appears from the evidence that
it was induced by fraud, or, in view of the nature of the claim, that the compensation provided for was so excessive as to evince a purpose on the part of the attorney to obtain an
improper or undue advantage over his client."
15. Memorandum on Behalf of the Defendants, prepared by the Attorney General of the
State of N.Y., p. 12.

16. 304 N.Y. 342, 346, 107 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1952).
17. That is, apart from the "reasonable standard" of Canons 12 and 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
18. See, e.g., Special Rules Regulating The Conduct of Attorneys and Counselors-at-Law
in the First Judicial Department, Rule 2.
19. 41 Cornell L.Q. 692 (1956).
20. Note 2 supra.
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given a construction quite different from that upon which the present decision
is to some degree based. If the legislative intention was not to create or sanction
an unfettered right of contract in attorneys generally, but solely to remove the
state legislature from the business of regulating the practices of officers of the
court,2 1 then it could be maintained that section 474 merely restored to the
courts and the judiciary in New York the strict control over attorneys enjoyed
in England, where from early days lawyers' compensation had been a matter of
court regulation2s2 If so, then the force of the provision that attorneys' contracts
are not to be restrained by law is to be directed at statutory law, legislative
enactment, and not court regulations. Viewed in this way, there is no inconsistency between rule 4 and section 474; and the rule may be validated as a
proper exercise of the rule-making power under section 83. Furthermore, validity
under section 90(2) would appear to require only that rule 4 operate within a
sphere of activity in which the court had the power to discipline. Since it is not
disputed that the court may discipline in a particular case for exaction of unconscionable fees, the authority for the rule may also lie in section 90(2).
Defendants maintained the right to advise the bar in advance of the standards
which shall in a particular case determine the question of professional misconduct. Such advance notice has been given the bar in other matters with no
discernible conflict resulting. 23 Thus, just as an attorney is limited in regard to
soliciting clients,24 and since the office is generally burdened with conditions,25
it seems consistent to allow control over compensation. Moreover, under the new
21. See First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings-Code of Procedure 204-05 (1348), quoted in 41 Cornell L.Q. 691 (1956) where it is reported: "We cannot
perceive the right of the state to . . . fixthe compensation which one (citizen] ... shall
receive from the other. ... [Tlhe only rightful supervision that the state may have over
[attorneys] . . .is to see that he does not abuse his license. ' There do remain, however,
certain statutory limitations upon attorneys' right to contract for fees, but thee in almost
every instance refer the determination of the fee to the discretion of the interested court. For
consideration of the argument that these statutes constitute specific exceptions to section 474
of the judiciary Law and are thus the sole exceptions under the principle "expremio unius est
exclusio alterius," see Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
22. Merritt v. Lambert, 10 Paige 352, 356-57 (N.Y. Chancery 1343). In 1 Chester,
Courts and Lawyers of New York 143 (1925), it is noted that "in England the fees of
attorneys and other officers of the court have generally been regulated by the court, and
not by any public act. In New York, however, the fees of public officers has been a matter
of public regulation from a very early period. Ten or twelve years after the restoration of
the province to the English, they were regulated by an ordinance of the governor, and
afterwards by acts of the General Assembly; and there is every reason to believe that the
practice, especially as respects the fees of attorneys and officers of the court, was derived from
the Dutch." See also, the Order of Common Pleas given in 1654, directing an inquiry into
the matter of fees and the establishment of a table of just fees, People ex. rel. Karlin
v. Cullin, 248 N.Y. 465, 476, 162 N.E. 4S7, 491 (1923).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. It would seem that a rule regulating the amount of income derived from lega1
services is of no more substantive a character than is a rule regulating the solicitation of clients
for those services.
25. Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. S1, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 733 (1917).
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rule, there is provision for a reasonable fee in every case, since that same judicial discretion, which has heretofore decided the conscionableness of fees after
their receipt, now tempers the rigidity of the scale in rule 4 by providing for a
fee higher than the scale upon application to the court and proof of the
reasonableness of the higher fee.
Even though on appeal the present case may be otherwise decided, the necessity and desirability of such a rule would seem to require fuller consideration
and investigation. Those investigations previously made failed to elicit facts
warranting such a rule or legislation of similar effect 20 To adopt a middle
course, requiring attorneys in personal injury suits and wrongful death actions
to file only closing statements would, at the very least, provide the court with
more reliable data upon which to determine the need for such a rule. The
prescriptive scale could profitably be held in abeyance until the results achieved
through those sections of rule 4 requiring closing statements could be analyzed.

Federal Civil Procedure - Corporation Aligned as Defendant in Dctermining Diversity of Citizenship in Stockholder's Derivative Suit.Plaintiff, a citizen of New York, instituted a stockholder's derivative suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Defendant
directors were citizens of California. The corporation of which plaintiff was a
stockholder and a corporation controlled by one of the individual defendants,
both incorporated in Delaware, were also named as defendants. The district
court, after a preliminary hearing, realigned the plaintiff's corporation as a party
plaintiff and dismissed for want of diversity of citizenship. The court of appeals
affirmed. On review, the United States Supreme Court, held, four justices dissenting, reversed. In a stockholder's derivative action the corporation is aligned
as a party defendant where the corporate management has manifested antagonism to the stockholder, and such antagonism is determined from the pleadings.
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
The usual forum for stockholder's derivative suits is the state courts,' with2
the possibility of trial in the federal courts when diversity of citizenship exists.
Such diversity must be complete so that no party on one side of the controversy is from the same state as any party on the other side.8 Thus the question
of whether the corporation is to be aligned as a party plaintiff or defendant is
vital when federal jurisdiction is in issue, and the corporation is a citizen of the
same state as one or more of the other parties.
As far back as 1855 it was held by the Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey 4
that unless the plaintiff's suit be a contrivance to give the court jurisdiction, the
federal court must take cognizance of the action and that defendants have the
26. 41 Cornell L.Q. 683 (1956).
See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1881).
"The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies
1.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
different States. . . ...
3. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) *267 (1806).
4. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 346 (1855).
1.
2.

. .

. between

Citizens

of
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burden of proving such contrivance.; In 1881 the Supreme Court in Hawes v.
City of OaklandO added the requirement that the plaintiff stockholder verify by
oath that the action was not a collusive one with respect to the court's jurisdiction. 7 The collusion usually took the form of an agreement between the management of a corporation and a stockholder whereby the latter would institute suit
in the name of the corporation so as to obtain the requisite diversity of citizenof legitimacy by a sham refusal on
ship. 8 The arrangement was given an aura
the part of the management to institute the suit at the behest of the stockholder.
The stockholder would join the corporation and the corporate management as
defendants, along with the third party who was the real defendant in interest.
The Supreme Court's requirement was designed to insure that the alignment of
parties, as presented in the stockholder's bill, reflected a legitimate controversy
between the stockholder and those running his corporation. A further significant
point is that the Court looked only to the nature of the charges contained in the
pleadings in determining whether a true controversy existed. It was the failure
of plaintiff to show in the pleadings a true controversy between himself and the
corporate management that caused dismissal of the suit.
In 1905, in Doctor v. Harrington,9 the first case dealing with the alignment
of parties for jurisdictional purposes, the plaintiff stockholders, citizens of New
Jersey, had alleged that the corporation and its board of directors were under
the absolute control of the defendant Harrington, a citizen of New York, who
had used this control to defraud the corporation. Since the latter was incorporated
in New York, it too was joined as a party defendant. The Supreme Court upheld
the alignment, holding that "the ultimate interest of the corporation made
defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the
corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a
way detrimental to his rights. In other words, his interests, and the interests
of the corporation, may be made subservient to some illegal purpose. If a
controversy hence arises, and the other conditions of jurisdiction exist, it can be
litigated in a Federal Court."' 0 The charges of fraud in the bill had been denied
in the answer. Unlike the trial court in the instant case, the trial court there
did not then conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the
charges of fraud were justified. Rather, the existence of antagonism was determined by the allegations in the pleadings. The Court stated that "the case at
bar is brought within the doctrine of those cases [establishing the right of a
5. At this time, the federal courts did not have the power to order realignment of the
parties and only the pleadings were examined in determining whether diverity jurizdiction

existed. This was remedied by the Act of March 3, 1375, 1S Stat. 470, 472, which authorized
the federal courts to dismis or remand to the court from whence it was removed any case
involving a controversy not within the court's jurisdiction or one in which the parti vere
collusively joined.

6. 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1331).
7. The rule as given was codified at the same term in Equity Rule 94 and is now incorporated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
3. 104 U.S. at 452.
9. 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
10. Id. at 5S7.
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stockholder to sue derivatively in the federal courts] by the allegations of the
bill.""
In 1908, in Venner v. Great Northern Ry.,12 the complaint alleged joint
fraudulent conduct on the part of the corporation and the other defendant, its
president, with whom it jointly resisted the charge. The resistance of the
corporation to the plaintiff's allegations was, in reality, no more than the
resistance of the president, who controlled its affairs. The Court, however,
upheld the alignment of the corporation as a party defendant. Again, it was
the allegations of the pleadings that determined the issue of antagonism, and
not a preliminary inquiry into their merits.
The Court in the present case was concerned primarily with the questions of
when a corporation is to be considered in antagonistic hands and how such
antagonism is to be determined. Is it in antagonistic hands only when it is
shown that those controlling it are guilty of fraud, breach of trust or some
similar conduct, or, on the other hand, whenever the management defends any
course of conduct attacked by the stockholder as detrimental to the corporation?
If the first proposition were the criterion, then, of necessity, a preliminary
inquiry must be conducted to evaluate the validity of the stockholder's charges
so as to determine whether the requirements for antagonism have been met.
However, as pointed out by the Court, this preliminary inquiry would be governed by federal rules, since it involves a determination of federal jurisdiction.
If, as a result of this preliminary inquiry, the federal court accepted jurisdiction,
the entire procedure would have to be repeated again at the trial of the merits of
the stockholder's suit. The trial would this time be governed by the law of the
state in which the action arose. 13 If the second proposition were the criterion,
then the court need do no more than examine the pleadings and if the plaintiff
stockholder's allegations are denied by the corporate management, antagonism is
manifest.
The majority opinion in the present case stated that

"...

the proper course

is not to try out the issues presented by the charges of wrongdoing but to
determine the issue of antagonism on the face of the pleadings and by the
nature of the controversy. The bill and answer normally determine whether the
management is antagonistic to the stockholder . . . . ,4 The Court argued that
"to stop and try the charge of wrongdoing is to delve into the merits.""1 This
would in the Court's opinion be ".

.

. a time-consuming, wasteful exertion of

energy on a preliminary issue in the case."' 16 In light of the prior holdings of
the Supreme Court, this view would appear to have greater merit than that
proposed by the minority.
The minority would adopt the rule advanced by the trial court giving antagonism a meaning related to the first proposition set forth above. The trial court
stated that "if the corporation has suffered actionable wrong and is 'in antago11.

Id. at 588.

12.

209 U.S. 24 (1908).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
354 U.S. at 96.
Id. at 95.

Ibid.
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nistic hands'--i.e. so dominated that it is incapacitated to act in keeping with
its own financial interests . . . a federal court should not ... align the corplaintiff-stockholder in determining whether diversity jurisporation with the
17
diction exists."
It should be noted that under the procedural requirements for maintaining a
stockholder's derivative suit in the federal courts,18 the plaintiff must allege in
his pleadings either that a demand was made on the corporate management to
take action on his complaint and the demand was refused, or that such a
demand would have been futile. Since these allegations are always either denied
or explained away by the defendants, antagonism as interpreted by the majority
opinion immediately arises. The corporation would, it would seem, be aligned
as a party defendant in every case.
If antagonism is to be the criterion for determining diversity jurisdiction, the
simplicity of the test advanced by the Court renders it more acceptable and
workable than that proposed by the minority opinion. However, the practical
effect of the decision is to give plaintiff stockholders in a derivative suit a choice
of suing either in the state or federal courts. Since the corporation will in effect
always be aligned as defendant, if suit in the federal courts appears more favorable, stockholders can obtain complete diversity by selecting from their number
a stockholder whose state citizenship differs from that of all the defendants.
Since state corporate law is applicable in stockholder's derivative suits, it would
seem more desirable to restrict such actions to the state courts as much as possible.
This could better be accomplished by aligning the corporation as plaintiff in every
case. Since one or more members of the board of directors are usually required
by statute to be citizens of the state of incorporation, no diversity would obtain,
at least where such director or directors are defendants in the action. Moreover,
such an alignment would be consistent with the basic theory of stockholder's
derivative suits, namely, that the action is brought for the benefit of the corporation. Such a change, however, would now seem to require congressional action.

Labor Relations -

Federal Pre-Emption of State Courts' Right to Award

Damages for Unfair Labor Practice.-Plaintiff, a union member, was involved in a controversy within his local concerning union funds and officers.

Plaintiff opposed the group in control of the local and, in retaliation, the union
prevented plaintiff from securing employment for almost a year. Plaintiff was
eventually compelled to find less remunerative work in another industry. He
filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board, but before a hearing
could be had, withdrew his charge and sued the defendant union in a state court
for the common-law tort of interference with employment. The jury awarded
him damages, and the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, hedd, three justices dissenting,
affirmed. The National Labor Relations Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and a state court has jurisdiction to award
17. Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781, Sol (S.D. Cal. 1953).
I8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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damages where the unfair labor practice is also a common-law tort. Seles v.
Teamsters Union, AFL, - Wash. 2d -, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
Under the federal pre-emption doctrine, whenever Congress legislates in a
field proper to it under the Constitution, that legislation, by virtue of the
supremacy clause,' supersedes all conflicting state law whether statutory or
decisional. 2 The effect of a specific federal statute upon state jurisdiction will
vary with the intent of Congress, but the effect may be either to take all jurisdiction from the states, give all jurisdiction to the states, or share concurrent
jurisdiction with them. 3 In areas of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law, if
conflicting with state law, will prevail. 4 However, a real problem arises when an
attempt is made to categorize legislation in one of the three classes.5
The National Labor Relations Board is empowered "to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice .. .affecting commerce." 0 The
Supreme Court has not found here any manifestation of congressional intent to
pre-empt the field but, in fact, has found that there is a wide area open to state
regulation.7 The line to be drawn has been traced by scores of cases, but it
can still be safely stated that each case must be decided on its own facts, for
"the areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and
bounds."8
It is clear that a state may not enjoin that which is permitted by the federal
statute,9 and unless exceptional circumstances can be shown, it may not enjoin
that which is prohibited by it.10 The compelling circumstances warranting exceptions have involved the use of state police power to enjoin violence resulting
from union activity,"'
or types of peaceful picketing which contravene state
2
public policy.'
The states have the power to act in that part of the labor relations field where
the NLRB is without power under the Act, and which, therefore, is either
governable by the state or not at all.' 3 It has, however, been established that
1. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For application in labor relations
see Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
3. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1941).
4. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2; Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
5. For guideposts in solving the jurisdictional question, see Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Chicago, 136 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D.IlI. 1955).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) (1956).
7. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
8. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
9. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
10. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

11. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
12. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (issue of pre-emption not raised); cf.
Giboney v. Empire Storage &Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
13. United Automobile Workers, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245, 254 (1949).

1957-58]

CASE NOTES

when the NLRB has power but declines jurisdiction on the ground that regulation would not be in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, a state may not substitute its own regulation. 14 And recently it has been held that if a case does not
come within the self-imposed monetary limits of the NLRB's jurisdiction, a state
may not automatically take jurisdiction.' 5
Supreme Court decisions denying state jurisdiction in labor disputes have
been based largely on the rationale that the matter was within the purview of
the NLRA and actual or potential conflict existed between federal and state
regulation in the field. Thus the Court has denied the states the right to determine union representation questions in all industries over which the NLRB has
jurisdiction,' 6 and had denied the power of a state to interfere with a right to
strike protected by federal statute,' 7 or to a demand that a strike vote precede
an actual strike.18
1
In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,' union agents demanded that the employees of the company join a union. Upon refusal of the
company and many of its employees, the union threatened the company with
violence to such a degree that the company was compelled to abandon its
projects. The Virginia state court awarded damages, 2- and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, 2 ' reasoning that since Congress had not prescribed a
procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct, ". . . there is
no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for
tortious conduct have been eliminated" 22 from state jurisdiction.
In the present case the Washington court relied heavily on the doctrine of
the Laburnum case. The majority decided that it was an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA for the union to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in regard to hire, and to interfere with the plaintiff's right to engage
in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. 23 This done, the real issue
was framed: "Does the National Labor Relations Board have exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving conduct which constitutes an unfair labor practice
under the Act, so as to preclude a state court from hearing and determining a
common-law tort action for damages resulting from interference with employment based on such conduct?" 2 4 The court concluded that it did not.
25
The defendant union had argued that Garncr v. Teamsters Union, AFL
14. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
15. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).

16. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 US. 18 (1949).
17. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1951).
18. United Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 US. 454 (1950).
19. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
20. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E2d 694

(1953).
21. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
22. Id. at 665.
23. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157-58 (1956).
Wash. 2d __, _.-, 314 P.2d 456, 459 (1957).
24. -

25. 346 U.S. 4SS (1953).
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controlled the present case. In the Garner case the union peacefully picketed an

interstate trucking firm to coerce the employees to join their union. The firm
obtained an injunction from a state court enjoining the picketing, but this was
promptly reversed by the state supreme court. Upon appeal, the United States

Supreme Court affirmed, declaring that "Congress has taken in hand this particular type of controversy . . ." and has given exclusive jurisdiction to the
NLRB, evidently considering that ". . . centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules. .... 26

The instant court found numerous reasons to distinguish the present case
from the Garner case, and to follow, instead, the authority of the Laburnum
case. In the Garner case Congress had provided a federal administrative remedy
with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. In the Laburnum case Congress had provided no substitute for the traditional state court procedure for
collecting damages resulting from tortious conduct. The Laburnum case was
quoted: "To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against
unfair labor practices, that case [the Garner case] recognized that the Act
excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. . . . The care we took
in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal
administrative remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict
had existed, the state procedure would have survived." 27 The present court
found no conflict and asserted jurisdiction. The NLRB could issue a cease and
desist order and might order reinstatement with or without back pay.28 The
state court pointed out that it was not issuing a cease and desist order nor ordering reinstatement and back pay, but was only ordering damages for the commonlaw tort.
The dissent considered itself bound by Mahoney v. Sailors' Union,20 where
this same court had held that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction in an action
by a former member against a union to grant him reinstatement in the union
and damages for earnings lost by reason of the union's unfair labor practice.
The majority scarcely considered this argument; it considered that a distinction
was readily apparent since in the present case only damages were sought while
in the Mahoney case reinstatement was also asked. The majority reasoned that
for a state court to order reinstatement would be to order a union to cease
committing an unfair labor practice and that such an action would bring the
state into collision with the NLRB.
The decision brings into focus the confusion existing in the state and federal
courts concerning jurisdiction where the act complained of is at once an unfair
labor practice and a common-law tort. The basic doctrine crystallized in the
Garner case is that a state may not afford relief for conduct subject to regulation by the NLRB. "[W]hen two separate remedies are brought to bear on
the same activity, conflict is imminent." 30 The Laburnum case cut into this
26. Id. at 488, 490.
27. 347 U.S. at 665.
28. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1956).
29. 43 Wash. 2d 874, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953).
30. 346 U.S. at 498-99.
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sweeping rule by allowing an injured party to recover damages for a commonlaw tort where the NLRB offered no such remedy. The instant court relied on
this exception to allow recovery for the tortious conduct of the union. That the
Laburnum case is in point is open to question.
In the Laburnum case the injured party was the company. It had been so
intimidated by the union that it was forced to give up several projects, and it
sued the union for lost profits. There is nothing in the INLRA which provides
a remedy in such a situation; thus, the state court exercised its traditional
common-law jurisdiction. "If the state court is denied jurisdiction in this case
it will mean that where federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent
or inadequate, the offenders . . . may destroy property without liability for
the damage done."'31 In the present case the injured party was a union member
suing for the damage caused by an unfair labor practice. His damages were the
wages lost during the period of discrimination against him. There is little
question but that the act covers such a case and affords a remedy. It has the
power ".. . to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [act]."2
Thus it seems that he had a completely adequate remedy with the NLRB, and
the Laburnum exception to the Garner rule should not apply to him.
The case is another in the long line of cases involving the NLRA where the
state courts have claimed concurrent jurisdiction3 and federal courts have given
sole jurisdiction to the Board. 34 Each claims jurisdiction, and it is difficult to
determine what view the Supreme Court will take. The states argue that since
Congress has not indicated a clear intent to pre-empt the field, they should
retain jurisdiction where it would not depend on the context of labor relations
as such. 35 For example, the NILRB affords a remedy for violence to unionorganizers, 36 but despite the fact that this is an unfair labor practice the state
courts contend that they should be free to award damages for assault and
battery. In their view the unlawfulness of the assault is not determined by, and
is not dependent on the fact that the violence was an unfair labor practice. If
the existence of a labor dispute is irrelevant, the states argue for jurisdiction.
The federal courts contend that the Garner case precludes a duplicity of
remedies. If the NLRB affords an adequate remedy, the states are prevented
from offering their remedy. The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide
whether any unfair labor practice has been committed and to determine how
31. 347 U.S. at 659.
32. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1956). See Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954).
33. Baffle v. Fisher, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. CL 1949); Wortex Mills v.
Textile Workers Union, CIO, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A.2d 815 (1954). Baun v. Lumber and Sawmill
Workers Union, AFL, 46 Wash. 2d 275, 284 P.2d 275 (1955).
34. Anson v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 222 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1955); Born v. Laube, 213
F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers' Union, 167 F.2d 183

(4th Cir. 1948).
35. The rationale of this position is presented in Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297, 1321 (1954).
36. NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1943).
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they shall be correctedY' "[W]here the moving party itself alleges unfair labor
practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections
prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the
federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded
by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal
which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance."08
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have leaned toward federal preemption. In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,3 9 the Court held that even

where the NLRB had refused to act, the state could not assert jurisdiction
without an express cession from the Board. Thus if the Board refused to act or
to cede jurisdiction,
we have a "no-man's land" where there can be a wrong
40
without a remedy.
The state's power to award damages for an act which is both an unfair labor
practice and a conmon-law tort was considered in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon41 but the Court refused to rule on that issue. There, the California Supreme Court had affirmed a superior court injunction and damage
award against a union which had sought by peaceful picketing to coerce the
employer into a union shop agreement. The Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction, but it refused to rule on the
contention that damages should be sustained under the Laburnum rule, because
the state opinion was ambiguous as to whether local or federal law had been
applied in awarding damages for the tort. The Court recognized that Laburnum
had allowed a state to grant compensatory relief under local tort law for violent
conduct but said: "We cannot know that the California court would have
interpreted' its own state law to allow an award of damages in this different
situation. 42

Just what the Court meant by this is open to speculation. Since it recognized
that the conduct complained of was peaceful picketing, perhaps it intended to
serve notice that it might not restrict the Laburnum case to its facts. Although
the Laburnum case did involve violence, its broad language has been construed
to support the award of damages for any infraction of state tort law. If San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon is, in fact, a hint that the Court will allow state
compensatory relief for nonviolent conduct, just how far will this be carried?
To allow a state to award damages in situations as in the instant case (where
compensation may be justified outside the context of labor relations) might not
be objectionable; but if a state be permitted to take jurisdiction merely because
it offers a different remedy while an adequate remedy exists in the NLRB, it
could use the damage award as an effective club to enforce a local labor policy
in a federally pre-empted area, and thus achieve by way of the back door that on
which the Garnercase has closed the front door.
37. United Brick & Clay Workers v. Robinson Clay Product Co., 64 F. Supp. 872 (N.D.
Ohio 1946).
38. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1954).
39. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).

40. The Court reached the same conclusion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
41. 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
42. Id. at 29.
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Republication as a New Cause of Action Against

Original Author.-An allegedly defamatory letter was written by the defendants to plaintiff's employer on February 23, 1955. It was republished by
the employer on March 23, 1956, to a promotion board convened to consider
plaintiff's record. Plaintiff instituted this action for libel on June 8, 1956.
Defendants maintained that the cause of action accrued on the date of the
original publication, and that it was, therefore, barred by the one year statute
of limitations. The trial court sustained the defendants' plea. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, held, two justices dissenting, reversed. A
republication of defamatory matter by third persons gives the injured party a
new and separate cause of action against the original author, provided such
republication is the natural and probable consequence of the author's act or
was actually or impliedly authorized or directed by him. lWeaver v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 199 Va. 196, 98 S.E.2d 687 (1957).
Since defamation is essentially injury to reputation, and reputation is the
opinion held of a man in his community, no cause of action is had unless the
false statement is brought to the attention of a third person. 1 Just as a man's
reputation may suffer from the original publication by the author to another, so
a republication or repetition of the defamatory statement adds to its notoriety,
and may therefore add to the damage already caused by the initial defamation.
An injured party has a cause of action against each person republishing or
repeating the defamatory statement as though he were the original author of
it.2 If the author himself republished the libel or slander, he would be liable for
the republication as well as for the original publication. 3 In addition, the author
of the defamation is liable for any republication or repetition by a third party
which is the natural and probable consequence of his act or was actually or
presumptively authorized or directed by him;4 but not for any republication
which is the independent and unauthorized act of another.5
Both the majority and dissent in the case at bar acknowledged that the author
was liable for the republication. But the majority held that the republication
constituted a new cause of action against the libeler, while the dissent argued
that republication was relevant only to the quantum of damages.0
1. Seelman, Libel and Slander in New York, para. 121 (1933).
2. Id. paras. 128, 141-42.
3. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson,
13S Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942) ; Hall v. Frankel, 1S3 Wis. 247, 197 N.W. 320 (1924);
53 CJ.S, Libel and Slander § 83 (1943).
4. Sawyer v. Gilmers, Inc., 1S9 N.C. 7, 126 S.E. 183 (1925); 53 CJ.S, Libel and
Slander § 85 (1948); 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander § 197 (1941).
5. 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 85 (194S).
6. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Murray
v. Galbraith, 36 Ark. 50, 109 S.W. 1011 (1903). It may be argued that the cases merely
stand for the proposition that a republication made prior to the commencement of an action
for an identical libel is not a new cause of action for which a separate suit may be maintained, but that such republication must be joined in the action for the original publication.
An analysis of the cases shows that they make no reference to a republication made after
an action for the primary publication has already been concluded, or where a suit on the
original defamation has been barred by the running of the statute of limitations.
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Every republication of the defamatory matter by the author himself consti-

tutes a new cause of action which is separate from, and independent of, the

cause of action arising out of the original publication. 7 In Underwood v. Smith,"
the defendant wrote a libelous article, which at his request was published in a
newspaper on April 11, 1892. The same article was republished by another
newspaper the following day, apparently with the consent of the defendant.
The injured party sued the defendant for the publication in the first paper and
recovered judgment. Thereafter the plaintiff brought another action against the
same party for the later republication in the second paper. The court, on appeal,
overruled the defendant's plea of res judicata stating: "Every separate and
distinct publication of a libel is a distinct offense, for which a separate action
will lie, and a recovery of damages for the first publication of the libel is no bar
to an action based upon its repetition or republication. "0
No distinction is made between the legal effect of a republication by the
author himself and a republication by a third party which was the natural and

probable consequence of the author's act. In respect to both, the prevailing
view is that every such republication gives a cause of action which is separate and
distinct from the cause of action arising out of the original publication.' 0 In
Union Associated Press v. Heath," the Associated Press had distributed a certain
libelous article to various newspapers. The court held that the Associated Press
would be liable for the original publication of the article by sending it to the
newspapers, and also for any republication of the libel by the newspapers, and
that liability of the Associated Press for the republication was entirely distinct
from that incurred for the original publication of the libel.
There is little justification for distinguishing between a republication by the
author himself and a republication which, though by another, is the natural
7. 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 84 (1948). And it would appear that the pendency
of an action for the original publication is no defense to an action for the republication of the
defamation. McKay v. Foster, 179 App. Div. 303, 166 N.Y. Supp. 331 (4th Dep't 1917).
8. 93 Tenn. 687, 27 S.W. 1008 (1894).
9. Id. at 688, 27 S.W. at 1009.
10. Jean v. Hennessy, 69 Iowa 373, 28 N.W. 645 (1886); Jennings v. Southern Ry., 156
S.C. 92, 152 S.E. 821 (1930); Irvine v. Barrett, 119 Va. 587, 89 S.E. 904 (1916). The
federal rule is in accord with the weight of authority. Spriggs v. Associated Press, 55 F. Supp.
385 (D. Wyo. 1944); Johnson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 449 (W.D.S.C.
1938). New York has repeatedly held to the same effect. Cook v. Conners, 215 N.Y. 175,
109 N.E. 78 (1915). In Mack, Miller Candle Co. v. MacMillan Co., 239 App. Div. 738, 742,
269 N.Y. Supp. 33, 38-39 (4th Dep't 1934), justice Edgcomb said: "It might be well to
add that we do not think the action is barred by the statute of limitations ....
Every
separate and distinct publication or repetition of defamatory matter is a distinct offense for
which an action will lie." In Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d
676 (1939), this was qualified by the single publication rule, which holds that the publication
of a libelous statement in a single issue of a magazine or newspaper, although such publication consists of thousands of copies, is one publication giving rise to one cause of action
and that the statute of limitations runs from the date of that publication. This single
publication rule was subsequently extended to include books in Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
11. 49 App. Div. 247, 63 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dep't 1900).
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and probable result of the author's act. When an author publishes a libel under
such circumstances that a repetition of it by a third party will almost surely
follow, then such republication by the third party is tantamount to a repetition
by the author himself.
In the present case, the dissenting justices contended that the authorities
relied on by the majority simply held that the original author of defamatory
matter is liable for any injurious consequences of a republication by a third
party if such republication is authorized or is the natural and probable result
of the original publication, and in an action against the original author founded
upon the orginal publication evidence of such republication will be admitted
solely on the question of damages.
Here, however, the action was not based upon the original publication. Rather,
it was based upon the republication thereof, and the authorities agree that such
action is distinct from an action founded upon the original publication. As was
pointed out by the court in Underwood v. Smith, the two actions may be quite
dissimilar. Mlalice may be involved in one and not the other; one may be
privileged and the other not; and most important, the damages resulting from
the original publication may substantially differ from those sustained by the
republication.
The instant case illustrates this last consideration. Plaintiff suffered little more
than nominal damages at the time of the original publication, but sustained
extensive injury when the defamatory letter was republished before a promotion
board convened to consider his record. Here the real wrong was not committed
at the time of the first publication, but upon the republication of the libel. To
deny the plaintiff his cause of action for compensatory damages against the
original author for the second publication on the ground that the statute of
limitations has run against the first publication would result in the deprivation
of a remedy against the person who impliedly authorized the republication
although the effects of his authorization had caused injury long after the statutory period had run. Although the plaintiff might always have resort against
the republisher, the latter's repetition may have been privileged, or other
defences may keep him immune from suit. In either event the author should be
held to account for a republication which was the natural and probable result
of his act.
Mechanic's Lien -

Statutory Trust for Benefit of Materialmen Where

Improved Property Is Outside State.-Plaintiffs, materialmen, furnished
materials to a subcontractor for the improvement of real property located in
Pennsylvania. As partial payment for the improvement, the subcontractor received a sum of money which it in turn paid over to the defendant, its factor, in
New York. Plaintiffs sought to compel the factor to account for these funds
allegedly impressed with a statutory trust for their benefit. The appellate
division reversed the special term order and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
held, two judges dissenting, affirmed. The provisions of the New York Lien
Law impressing a trust for the benefit of materialmen on funds received for the
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improvement of real property do not apply where the real property is located
outside the state. Allied Thermal Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 302,
144 N.E.2d 66 (1957).
Section 36-b of the New York Lien Law impresses, for the benefit of laborers
and materialmen, a statutory trust on funds received by a subcontractor for the
improvement of real property.' People v. Levitt held that section 36-b does
not deprive the subcontractor of his property without due process of law, and is
therefore constitutional. 2 Diversion of funds by a subcontractor in violation of
this section originally subjected him to penal sanctions only.8 Now, however,
the trust can be enforced ". . . by any person entitled to share in the trust fund
in a representative action brought for the benefit of all persons entitled to share
in the fund."' 4 To succeed in this civil action, a materialman has the burden of
proving that there was a diversion of the trust funds at a time when there were
existing claims, that his claim is due and unpaid, and that the transferee was
not an innocent purchaser for value.5 This trust fund remedy, while affording
materialmen an added degree of protection, does not purport to be exclusive.
The plaintiff can still proceed to foreclose any lien he may have or take any
other action which would enable him to recover a money judgment for the
amount due him.6
Although set forth within the general framework of the Lien Law, this statutory trust is not a true mechanic's lien. Even though the purpose of both is to
provide protection for those whose services and materials enhance the value of
real property, a mechanic's lien attaches to the land and the buildings erected
on it, 7 giving materialmen an interest in that property to the extent of the
value of the materials supplied,8 while the statutory trust is impressed upon
the fund paid to the subcontractor for the improvement of real property, and
not upon the realty itself. By its very nature, a mechanic's lien is restricted to
real property within the state, because one state has no power to place an
incumbrance on property within the jurisdiction of another state. However, the
legislature does have the power to impress a trust upon funds paid and diverted
in this state regardless of where the realty is located.9
1. N.Y. Lien Law § 36-b. "The funds received by a subcontractor from an owner or

contractor or subcontractor for the improvement of real property are hereby declared to
constitute trust funds in the hands of such subcontractor to be applied first to the payment
of the claims of the subcontractors, laborers and materialmen, arising out of the
improvement .... "
2. 145 Misc. 621, 622, 260 N.Y. Supp. 458, 460 (1932).
3. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Federation Bank & Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 452, 462, 43
N.E.2d 486, 491 (1942).
4. N.Y. Lien Law § 71.
5. 26 Fordham L. Rev. 355, 357-58 (1957).
6. N.Y. Lien Law § 76.
7. This is true only in cases of improvements on privately owned property. In public
improvements, the lien attaches to the money allocated by the city for that improvement.
John Kennedy & Co. v. New York World's Fair, 260 App. Div. 386, 388, 22 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903
(2d Dep't), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 494, 41 N.E.2d 789 (1939).
8. Schaghticoke Powder Co. v. Greenwich & J. Ry., 183 N.Y. 306, 310, 76 N.E. 153, 154

(1905).
9. Mallory Associates Inc. v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949).
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In the present case, the majority held that it was not the intent of the legislature to make the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law applicable in the
absence of jurisdiction over the property improved, and that to determine the
legislative intent, the section should be read and considered in conjunction with
the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. The court argued that since
the lien sections of the article can not apply to real property outside the state,
the trust fund section does not apply to such property in the absence of an
express declaration to the contrary.
The appellate division had reasoned that since the trust funds and the rights
flowing therefrom arise out of and are incident to the improvement, the sole
jurisdiction should be in the state where the property is located, 10 and that confusion would abound from any other construction, since other states may
protect materialmen by provisions differing from the New York Lien Law.
Therefore, the court argued, these remedies should be administered, controlled,
and coordinated by the jurisdiction in which the property is located.
The dissent took the position that the language of section 36-b is clear and
free from any ambiguity, and that since the legislature did not exspressly limit
its application to improvements located within the state, the courts should not
limit it by judicial construction. 11 When considered in their usual sense, the
dissent stated, the words of the section indicate that anyone entitled to share
in the fund can enforce the trust regardless of where the real property is
situated.' 2
The dissent stressed the point that the court would not be giving extraterritorial effect to the section by allowing recovery. It was reasoned that since
the section involved does not purport to confer any rights in the real property
itself, the location of the property is not controlling. The fund, paid and diverted in New York, is the subject matter of the trust and since the res and the
parties to the diversion are before the court, it clearly has jurisdiction.1 3
In Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co.,'4 it was held that a statutory
provision making the deposit of a security for a lease a trust fund was applicable
even though the lease was related to realty in another state.1, The Court of
Appeals there stated: "in so holding, we are not giving extraterritorial effect
to the statute, but. . . we are permitting it to govern the rights and liabilities
of corporations created by New York, under a New York contract, with respect
10. Allied Thermal Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 3 A.D2d 193, 200, 159 N.Y.S.2d 116,
117 (Ist Dep't 1957).
11. Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 302, 90 N.E2d 463, 471
(1949).
12. N.Y. Lien Law § 36-b.
13. Ridgefield Supply Co. v. Rosen, 1 Misc. 2d 675, 147 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. CL 1955).
14. 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949). The Mallory case involved the interpretation of
Real Prop. Law § 233 which states that "whenever money shall be deposited or advanced on
a contract for the use or rental of real property as security for the performance of the
contract . . . such money . . . shall continue to be the money of the person making such
deposit or advance and shall be held in trust by the person with whom such depost or
advance shall be made... 2'
15. Id. at 301, 90 NE.2d at 471.
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to a New York subject matter, viz., the security deposit."' 1 The decision in the
Mallory case lends persuasive support to the present dissent. Both cases involved statutes which were designed, not to protect the realty located outside
New York, but to protect the fund paid over in New York by changing a
debtor-creditor relationship into a trust fund relationship. The basic issues
presented to the court in each case were substantially similar, and yet the
majority opinion in the principal case neither overruled nor distinguished the
17
Mallory case.
Precedent aside, there are indications in the statute itself that the legislature
did not intend a limited application. The dissent noted "there are no words of
limitation, territorially speaking, in section 36-b. As it reads, it applies to all
funds received by a subcontractor from an owner, contractor or subcontractor
'for the improvement of real property.' ".Is In addition, the trust may be enforced ". . . by any person entitled to share in the fund, whether or not he
shall have filed, or had the right to file, a notice of lien . . .,"0 an indication
that the legislature was considering property in another state where New York
materialmen would not have the right to file a notice of lien pursuant to this
statute. Finally, the purpose of the section is to protect materialmen by giving
them a priority of payment; it should be construed liberally to give effect to
that purpose. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature wanted to protect
all the materialmen that it has the power to protect, and not just those who
supplied materials to improve property located in New York. As a matter of
fact, the need for protection is greater when the property is outside the state
because in such a situation the materialmen cannot resort to enforcement of
the lien given by the New York statute.

Negligence - Sudden Emergency Exception to the Assured Clear Distance
Ahead Rule.--Three vehicles, the first of which was driven by the defendant
while intoxicated, and the third of which was plaintiff's vehicle, were proceeding
west on a four lane highway. The second and third vehicles moved into the
"fast" lane in order to pass the first. Defendant, suddenly and without warning, turned to his left in front of the second vehicle, drove onto the left shoulder,
turned and drove back across the highway to the right shoulder. To avoid col16. Id. at 302, 90 N.E.2d at 471.
17. The court might also have found an analogous case in Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936). There the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered the application of N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 114, and held that it
is illegal for officers of a foreign corporation doing business in New York to transfer corporate
property located outside the state in violation of a New York statute. The court reasoned
that it did not need jurisdiction over the property involved to declare this transfer Illegal,
because the subject matter of the action was the transfer itself which took place in New
York; and the place where an act occurs fixes its jural character. (Id. at 171). The court
went on to say that it is no defense to a liability arising out of a consensual transaction that
it may have indirect effects on extraterritorial rights.
18. 3 N.Y.2d at 308, 144 N.E.2d at 70 (dissenting opinion).
19. N.Y. Lien Law § 36-b.
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lision, the driver of the second car applied his brakes. The plaintiff's driver attempted to stop, lost control, and collided with the rear of the second vehicle.
At the trial, judgment was rendered for plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, held, one justice concurring separately, three justices dissenting, affirmed. A driver is not as a matter of law contributorily negligent where
his inability to stop his vehicle within the assured clear distance ahead is attributable to a sudden emergency. Sun Oil Co. v. Scamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84
N.W.2d 840 (1957).
The Michigan statute requires that "...
no person shall drive any vehicle
upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead."1 In other words, the operator of a
motor vehicle, whether driving by night or day, must at all times be able to
stop his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen ahead of it 2
Thus, where two vehicles are traveling in the same direction, the driver of the
rear one must maintain a speed which will enable him to prevent a rear-end
collision in the event the front vehicle stops suddenly. As a result, the assured
clear distance ahead can be no greater than to the rear of the preceding vehicle.
The statute is invoked with equal force whether the object struck is moving
forward or is at rest.5
Violation of the statute, resulting in an accident, constitutes negligence as a
matter of law." The burden is on the party seeking to escape the legal effect of
the statute to prove a state of facts over which he had no control, so that compliance therewith was made impossible.7 This sudden emergency is the exception
to the rule, and may be stated thus: the driver must be able to bring his
vehicle to a stop within the clear distance ahead ". . unless such assured clear
distance ahead is suddenly cut down or lessened, without his fault, by the
entrance within such clear distance ahead and into his path or line of travel of
1. Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.627a (Supp. 1956). The statute is a codification of the
Michigan common law. Odell v. Powers, 284 Mich. 201, 205, 278 N.W. 819, 820 (1938). The
assured clear distance ahead rule is part of the common law of other states. See Haines
v. Carroll, 126 Kan. 403, 267 Pac. 986 (1923); Ruth v. Blomquist, 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W.
572 (192S); Weston v. Southern Ry., 194 N.C. 210, 139 S.E. 237 (1927); West Constr. Co.
v. White, 130 Tenn. 520, 172 S.W. 301 (1914); Lauson v.Town of Fond Du Lac, 141 Wis.
57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909). Four states, Iowa, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, have statutes
similar to the Michigan statute.
2. Lindquist v. Thierman, 216 Iowa 170, 248 N.W. 504 (1933); Ruth v. Vroom, 245
Mlich. 88, 222 N.W. 155 (1928); Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 133 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d
3 (1941); Whitney v. Douglas, Okla. 1, 307 P.2d 154 (1957); Stark v. Fullerton
Trucking Co., 318 Pa. 541, 179 Ad. S4 (1935).
3. Higbee Co. v. Lindemann, 131 Ohio St. 479, 3 N.E2d 426 (1936); Mcek v. Allen,
162 Pa. Super. 495, 493, 58 A.2d 370, 371 (1943).
4. Ter Haar v. Steele, 330 Mich. 167, 172, 47 N.W.2d 65, 6S (1951).
5. Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Nat'l Home, 323 Mich. 4M3, 493, 44 N.W2d 19,
21 (1950).
6. Wosoba v. Kenyon, 215 Iowa 226, 243 N.W. 569 (1932); Alexander v. Yund, 339
Mich. 441, 445, 64 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1954) ; Mlorr v. Mlerkle, 47 Ohio App. 533, 192 N.E. 279
(1932) ; Griffith v. Weiner, 373 Pa. 184, 95 A.2d 517 (1953).
7. Glasco v. Mendelman, 143 Ohio St. 649, 653, 56 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1944).
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some obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to

avoid colliding therewith." 8
Had plaintiff been found contributorily negligent in the instant case, a
recovery would have been barred.9 However, the court applied .the sudden
emergency exception and found no contributory negligence. The application of
the exception to such a set of facts is a questionable one, and is virtually without
support by case law.'0 The majority reasoned that "if the emergency exception
seems unduly narrow in scope and phrasing, we should re-examine its content
as drunken drivers jeopardize the peace and safety of our citizens on the highways of the state.""
Justice Kelly, concurring, cited the opinion of the trial judge to the effect that
plaintiff did not have reason to anticipate that the negligence of defendant
would render his stopping imperative. He found that this lack of reasonable
foreseeability justified employment of the exception, arguing that the clear
distance ahead is measured only from the time that the driver of the rear
vehicle discovers the danger of collision. If he discovers the danger too late,
(assuming that he has been reasonably alert) he has not violated the statute.
The minority answered that "it would impute nothing short of foolishness to
the legislative intent to say that the assured, clear distance ahead statute was
not intended to apply when everything ahead of the driver seems safe, but only
to apply after and when, due to previous disregard of its provisions, an emergency arises in which compliance with the statute is no longer possible. Under
that sort of theory it would follow that the statute need not be heeded under
the first situation and cannot be under the second."' 2 There is indeed authority
for the minority view.' 3
The minority summed up by observing that the intent of the statute is
8. Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 88, 33 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1941). (Emphasis
added.); accord, Ter Haar v. Steele, 330 Mich. 167, 175, 47 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1951); Stark
v. Fullerton Trucking Co., 318 Pa. 541, 179 Atl. 84 (1935).
9. Prosser, Torts § 53 (2d ed. 1955). However, under the rule of comparative negligence,
plaintiff's contributory fault is not a bar to recovery, but results only in a division of
damages. Ibid. The comparative negligence rule does not prevail in Michigan. Gibbard
v. Cursan, 225 Mich. 311, 320, 196 N.W. 398, 401 (1923).
10. The case of Rossien v. Berry, 305 Mich. 693, 9 N.W.2d 895 (1943), would seem to
support the majority and concurring views. In that case, there was evidence that plaintiff
drove his car into the rear of defendant's vehicle when the latter stopped suddenly. The trial
judge refused to hold plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and left to the
jury the application of the sudden emergency exception. The Supreme Court of Michigan
found no error. The case is an anomaly. Since it was decided, it has not been again referred
to in a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court.
11. 349 Mich. at 840, 84 N.W.2d at 849.
12. Id. at -, 84 N.W.2d at 853.
13. Ruth v. Vroom, 245 Mich. 88, 91, 222 NA. 155, 156 (1928), where the court said, "It
is not enough that a driver be able to begin to stop within the range of his vision, or that
he use diligence to stop after discerning an object. ZThe rule makes no allowance for delay
in action. He must, on peril or legal negligence, so drive that he can and will discover an
object, perform the manual acts necessary to stop, and bring the car to a complete halt
within such range."
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"... to prohibit travelling at a speed such that when the necessity for stopping
first becomes apparent, it is, as here, no longer possible to do so in time to avert
.acollision." The sudden emergency exception, it stated, should be employed
only ". . . when one's assured clear distance ahead has been suddenly shortened
by the unlawful and not to be anticipated actions of another . . "14 The
sudden emergency exception applies only when the obstruction enters witldn
the clear distance ahead. 1' Here defendant's vehicle did not enter within the
clear distance ahead between plaintiff's vehicle and the rear of the preceding car.
Further, the statute requires that the driver of the following car be able to stop
within the clear distance ahead if the driver of the preceding car brakes
suddenly. 16 Here, plaintiff manifestly was unable to stop before colliding with
the preceding vehicle. Moreover, although it may be true that defendant's
negligent act was not foreseeable in the exercise of ordinary care, nevertheless,
"where two vehicles are travelling in the same direction, the legislature has
7
placed safety foremost and has prescribed a higher degree of care.'1
If the majority's new interpretation of the sudden emergency exception is to
be resorted to only when the party seeking the protection of the assured clear
distance ahead statute has been intoxicated and reckless, then there was no need
to change the law. In such a case, plaintiff's contributory negligence is no
defense to an action based on defendant's recklessnessY3 On the other hand, the
concurring opinion carried the majority view to its logical conclusion by substituting for the extraordinary care imposed by the statute, a standard of care
based on reasonable foreseeablity. Such a rule would of course render the
statute superfluous, and would seem to thwart the intention of the legislature to
create a "rule of safety" and to prescribe a "higher degree of care."19

Process - Service Upon Legal Representative of Deceased Nonresident
Motorist.-Plaintiffs, residents of Florida, and decedent, a resident of Kansas,
were involved in an automobile accident on a Missouri highway resulting in the
death of the decedent. Plaintiffs instituted suit in Missouri and claimed jurisdiction over the defendant, a Kansas-appointed legal representative of the
decedent, in accordance with a Missouri statute providing for service upon the
legal representative of a deceased nonresident motorist by service upon the
Secretary of State. Defendant moved to dismiss. The district court held, motion sustained. A state "long-arm service statute," in so far as it provides for
service upon foreign legal representatives of deceased nonresident motorist, is
14. 349 Mlich. at -, 84 N.W.2d at S53, 354.
15. See note S supra.
16. See note 3 supra.
17. Ter Haar v. Steele, 330 Mlich. 167, 175, 47 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
18. Gibbard v. Cursan, 225 lich. 311, 196 N.W. 393 (1923); 3-4 Huddy, Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law § 186 (9th ed. 1931) ; Prosser, Torts § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
19. These expressions of legislative intent are to be found in Ter Haar v. Steelc, 330 Mich.
167, 175, 47 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1951). The common-law rule was the same. See Ruth v. 'Vroom,
243 Mfich. 8, 91, 222 N.W. 155, 156 (1928), where the court asserted that the rule .. . .does
not raise merely a rebuttable presumption of negligence. It is a rule of safety."
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an unconstitutional extension of the state police power. Brooks v. National
Bank, 152 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
Nonresident motorist service statutes exist in all forty-eight states, ' and uniformly provide that a nonresident who operates a motor vehicle within a state
consents to the appointment of an official of that state as agent for service of
process in personal injury or property damage actions resulting from tortious
operation of the vehicle, and that process served in this manner shall have the
same force and validity as if personally served within the state.2 Nonresident
motorist service statutes have been held constitutional. 8 In order to give the
plaintiff a remedy in the event of the nonresident's death, several states have
amended their statutes to provide that the operation of a vehicle within a state
by a nonresident
motorist shall be deemed a consent to service upon his legal
4
representative.
A legal representative has been held to be a creature of the state of his
appointment, and may not, in his representative capacity, sue or be sued outside the appointing state.5 A legal representative is not personally liable for
claims against the decedent and may be sued only in his representative capacity,6 with recovery limited to the assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction. 7
Since there was no property of the decedent's over which the present court
could assert authority, it concluded that it lacked any basis for either an in rem
or an in personam jurisdiction.8
Service under nonresident motorist service statutes, as noted, has been held
valid upon the theory that the use of the highway is an irrevocable, impliedin-law consent by the nonresident motorist to designate a state official as his
agent to accept service of process.0 The United States Supreme Court so held
1. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (NDl. Iowa 1947).
2. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 544 (1951). To assure due process, the statutes generally provide
for sending a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant by registered mail, return
receipt requested.
3. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
4. E.g., Arkansas, Michigan, New York. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 544 (1951).
5. Vaughan v. Northup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841). The rule barring legal representatives
from suit outside the state of their appointment has been rather inflexible. Suits have been
permitted against foreign legal representatives when there were assets within the forum's
jurisdiction, 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators § 1013 (1942). By statute, a foreign
legal representative may sue in more than half the states. See 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws

§ 507.2 (1935).
6. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 190 (3d ed. 1949).
7. 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators § 1013 (1942).
8. For a similar analysis, see Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (NJ). Iowa 1947). An
action will not lie against a foreign legal representative because of the impossibility of
enforcing a judgment against him. A judgment against a foreign legal representative is
payable out of the estate only. It cannot be enforced in the foreign state, for there is no
estate there, nor in the state which appointed the legal representative, for that state will
refuse to enforce the judgment on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction. See
3 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 512.1 (1935).
9. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

1957-58]

CASE NOTES

in Hess v. Pawloski.10 In Leighton v. Roper," the New York Court of Appeals
extended this consent theory to uphold service upon a foreign legal representative under the New York nonresident motorist statute because of the particular
need for such service, but conceded that a statute attempting to e.xpose foreign
representatives to all types of suits would be invalid.1'
These courts have adopted a legal fiction because dearly there is no real
consent on the part of the motorist. If this be so, what then is the real basis
of jurisdiction in the Hess and Leighton cases? The unspoken implication behind such decisions seems to be that the state where the accident occurs has a
sufficient governmental interest13 in protecting and promoting the welfare of its
citizens by regulating the use of its highways so as to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist. Will the Supreme Court
carry this to the point of holding that such governmental interest outweighs
the common-law rule that a legal representative is not liable to suit in his
representative capacity outside of the state of his appointment? If the Court
so holds, a judgment rendered by the foreign court would be entitled to full
faith and credit in the appointing state when brought there for enforcement.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a California statute which subjected a foreign insurance corporation to suits on
an insurance contract entered into with a resident of that state.' 4 Plaintiff, a
California resident, entered into an insurance contract with defendant insurance
corporation after a solicitation through the mails. The defendant employed no
agents in California and did not have any offices there. The court held that it
was sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based upon a contract which had a substantial connection with the state. The interest of California in providing an effective means of redress for its residents of claims
against their insurer was given primary consideration. The hardships and disadvantages of having to bring suit in a distant state were also given much
weight by the Court. The Court appeared to place more importance on the
governmental interest involved than the extent of the contacts required to
satisfy due process. The decision points up the current liberal trend of the
Supreme Court in finding jurisdiction where a sufficient governmental interest
appears.
10. Ibid.
11. 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E2d 876 (1950).
12. Id. at 439-40, 443, 91 N.E.2d at 879, S31; accord, Oiatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792,
171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) ; Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950) ; TarczynskI
v. Chicago, M. St. P. and Pac. R.R., 261 Wis. 149, 52 N.W.2d 396 (1952).
13. Jurisdiction is based upon contacts between the party and the state of the forum.
When there are sufficient contacts, and the state of the forum has a sufficient interest in the
matter it may acquire jurisdiction over such party and satisfy the demands of due process.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 317 (1945), the Supreme Court held
a foreign corporation, by doing business in the state of the forum, established the necessawy
contacts and the state's interest in regulating business within its borders was a suffident basis
for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. See Watson v. Employers Liab. A&surance Corp.,
348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954), for a discussion of governmental interest.
14. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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The instant decision reaches a harsh result. A plaintiff having a tort claim
against the deceased nonresident motorist would have to bring the action
against the legal representative in the state of his appointment, which could be
many miles away. The plaintiff's witnesses would be in the foreign state, but
the action would have to be brought in the appointing state; such litigation
would obviously be inconvenient and costly. To mitigate the harshness of the
existing law, one possible solution, pending a Supreme Court decision, would
be the adoption by all states of reciprocal agreements granting jurisdiction to
each sister state over legal representatives, when a nonresident motorist statute
provides for such service. 15 It is submitted that the problem is of sufficient
importance to warrant consideration of a uniform statute designed to accomplish
that result.
Unfair Competition - Right To Enjoin Out-of-State Retailers Selling
Below Fair-Trade Prices.-Defendant corporation, a wholly owned and closely
supervised subsidiary of a New York retail corporation, is a mail order discount
house located in the District of Columbia, a non-fair-trade jurisdiction. Twothirds of its sales are "over the counter." Defendant sold plaintiff's appliances
by mail to New York customers below the New York fair-trade prices, pursuant
to orders received in the District of Columbia on order forms distributed both by
the defendant in the District of Columbia and its parent corporation in New
York. The parent corporation also distributed advertising material concerning
the defendant's prices directly to its New York customers. The district court
granted an injunction. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, one judge dissenting, reversed. A state fair-trade statute
is unenforceable against a seller located in a non-fair-trade jurisdiction where
title to the goods passes in the non-fair-trade jurisdiction. General Elec. Co. v.
Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824
(1957).
"Under the common law, there was complete freedom of resale, and retail
price fixing by the wholesaler was unenforceable. . . .", However, the majority
of states have enacted fair-trade laws, which permit producers and manufacturers
of trade-marked merchandise, which is in fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class, to enter into contracts with wholesale and
retail distributors, specifying the minimum prices below which such goods may
not be resold. 2 These contracts are binding, not only on the contracting parties,
but also on all other retailers or wholesalers who sell the manufacturer's trademarked merchandise with notice of the fair-trade contract.3 A person who
willfully and knowingly advertises, offers for sale or sells any commodity at
15.

Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 851-52 (N.D. Iowa 1947).

1. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 207 Misc. 283, 288, 136 N.Y.S.2d 800, 804 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
2. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-a.
3. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 2 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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less than the fair-trade price stipulated in the contract, is guilty of unfair com4
petition and therefore liable to any person damaged thereby
Originally fair-trade laws were applicable only to intrastate trade. In 1937,
the Sherman Act was amended so as to provide that nothing therein contained should render illegal contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
prices of trade-marked commodities, when contracts or agreements of that
description were lawful under any statute in effect in any state in which such
resale was to be made, or to which the commodity was to be transported for
0
such resale.- In 1952 Congress enacted the McGuire Act, which permitted the
. to apply to com".
statutes
non-signer provisions of the state fair-trade
in or affecting interstate or foreign
and
activities
agreements,
modities, contracts,
7
commerce."
Chief Judge Clark, writing the opinion for the court, underscored the reference in the McGuire Act to fair-trade contracts which are lawful in states "in
which such resale is to be made." s He concluded from the use of the word
resale that the act was intended to govern only such resales as were made in
jurisdictions having fair-trade laws and that a contract made in a fair-trade
state, but governing a resale in a non-fair-trade state, would not be within its
purview. The manufacturer, therefore, would have no remedy unless the reale
occurred in a fair-trade state.0 It was Judge Clark's view that the place of
resale should be determined by the place where title passed according to the
law of sales.10 Since the fair-trade state customers purchasing goods from the
defendant corporation knew of the advantages of title passing in the free-trade
District of Columbia, where such discounts were legal, the court held that the
law of the fair-trade state could not be presumed to apply.
Judge Waterman, concurring, rejected the "title test" and proposed that the
situs of the retailer should determine which state law should apply. He pointed
out that, prior to the McGuire Act, Congressman Cole of Kansas offered an
amendment to protect retailers in fair-trade areas from cut-rate retailers in
non-fair-trade areas."' This amendment was rejected. Judge Waterman reasoned
4. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369-b.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1956 Supp.), often referred to as the Mliller-Tydings Act. This act,
which amends § 1 of the Sherman Act, has been incorporated into and added as a proviso
to the first sentence of that section.

6.

15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1956 Supp.).

7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 note (1956 Supp.).
S. "Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render
unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated price... when
contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions
under any statute ... in effect in any State ... in which such resale is to be made . .. .
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (2) (1956 Supp.).
9. See also Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 140 F. Supp. 165
(D. Aid. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957).
10. Uniform Sales Act § 19.
11. Representative Cole's amendment provided in part that "whenever by contract or
agreement described in subsection (2) a . . . minimum resale price may be established for

a commodity in any State . . . where such a contract or agreement is lawful, it -hall be
an act of unfair competition, actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby, to will-
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that the absence of the proposed phrase, ". . deliver pursuant to a sale, or
otherwise deliver" in a fair-trade jurisdiction, showed that the intention of Congress was that a retailer should be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in
which he is located. But from the rejection of this amendment, one could reason
just as strongly that Congress intended that the law of the place of the passage
of title be controlling.
In Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 12 decided before the passage of the McGuire
Act, it was held that the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Actia did not apply to sales
by Pennsylvania non-signing retailers to consumers in other states, or to advertisements published in other states. The concurring opinion concluded that
"when Congress created the McGuire Act, it indicated that one of its express
purposes was to 'overrule' the Wentling decision, and to permit the individual
states to apply their fair-trade laws to interstate shipments such as those involved in Wentling."' 4 However, the McGuire Act only added to the existing
law an additional provision excluding the state non-signer provisions from the
sanctions of the antitrust laws.' 6 The defendant in the Wentling case was a non-

signer. Statutory exceptions to the antitrust laws have always been strictly
construed.' 6 By construing the McGuire Act strictly one finds that it overhules
the Wentling case only in as much as it permits non-signer provisions to apply
to interstate commerce. This does not lend support to the retailer-situs construction put forth by Judge Waterman.
Judge Lumbard, in his dissent, was of the opinion that for all practical

purposes the District of Columbia corporation was merely an out-of-state warehouse and office for the New York parent corporation, and that the sales complained of took place in New York which could prohibit them. Because of the
supervision and control by the parent and the New York contacts which the
defendant corporation enjoyed, the dissent would disregard the situs of the

District subsidiary. This reasoning would ignore the fact that the defendant
was separately incorporated and did most of its business in across the counter
sales.
Assuming title to the merchandise passed in the District of Columbia, could
the defendant corporation be enjoined from making offers or advertising in New
fully and knowingly, in interstate commerce (1) sell or (2) have transported for sale or
resale or (3) deliver pursuant to a sale, or otherwise deliver, such commodity In any
State . . . where such a contract or agreement is lawful, at less than the price or prices so
established in such contract or agreement." 98 Cong. Rec. 4952 (1952).
12. 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950).
13. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 7-8 (1953).
14. 244 F.2d at 689.
15.

"Nothing contained in this section

. . .

shall render unlawful the exercise

. . .

of

any right or right of action created by any statute ... in effect in any State ... which In substance provides that willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any
commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such
a contract or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby." 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (3) (1956 Supp.).
16. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 184 F.2d 11, 16 (5th Cir. 1950)
(dissenting opinion).
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York? This was the second problem. Judge Clark stated that "the critical
question is still the place of resale, and no enforcement action may be brought
for advertising or offering goods for sale below the fair-trade prices unless the
ad or offer contemplated resales in a fair-trade jurisdiction.1' 17 In the instant
case it was contemplated that the resales were to take place in the District of
Columbia, so no enforcement action would lie against the defendant corporation for making offers or advertising in New York.
If the McGuire Act makes the law of the place of resale the applicable law,18
then the law of the place where the advertisement is published or where the offer
is made becomes immaterial. Under Judge Clark's appraisal this is what the
McGuire Act prescribes and all questions are to be resolved by the "title test."
Under this theory, it follows that even a New York retailer need not abide
by the New York law where the sale was to an out-of-state consumer, and the
parties intended that title would pass in the consumer's state. In the past Congress has rushed to the aid of fair-trade laws when they were restricted by judicial opinions.'2 The rejection of the Cole Amendment, however, which would
have allowed the states to control such mail-order sales, indicates that further
help may not be forthcoming. If the volume of business of out-of-state mail
houses, operating unhampered by fair-trade laws, increases to the point of
jeopardizing domestic retailers who are restricted by fair-trade laws, it might
well be that this case is a marker on the way to the effective abolition of fairtrade laws.
Vendor and Purchaser - Right of Purchaser to Proceeds of Vendor's
Insurance on Real Property.-Plaintiff, purchaser under a contract to buy
realty, took possession of the premises, and as provided in the contract, paid
the premiums on fire insurance issued in the vendor's name. Before transfer of
title, a fire materially destroyed the premises and the vendor was indemnified
by the insurer. Plaintiff brought an action for specific performance of the
contract, and to have the insurance proceeds applied in reduction of the purchase price. Judgment for plaintiff was unanimously affirmed by the appellate
division. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, three judges
dissenting, affirmed. Where a land purchase contract requires a purchaser to
pay the vendor's fire insurance premiums, and purchaser bears the risk of los,
the purchaser is entitled to have the proceeds of the insurance applied in reduction of the purchase price. Raplee v.Piper, 3 N.Y.2d 179, 143 N.E.2d 919
(1957).
17.

244 F.2d at 684-S5. See also Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co,

240 F.2d 684, 6S7-SS (4th Cir. 1957), where Judge Soper stated that "... the advertisement
must relate to a sale of goods within the State in order to fall within the condemnation of
[T~he prohibited acts are listed in a single phrase as 'advertising, offering
the statute ....
for sale or selling any commodity,' and since the prohibition against selling is of nercesIty
confined to Maryland sales, the associated acts of advertising or offering for sale must
likewise be concerned with sales within the State."
18. See note 9 supra.
19. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 135 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), and the subsequent
enactment of the McGuire Act.

728

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

At common law, unless otherwise expressly provided, an executory contract
to buy and sell real property placed the risk of loss immediately upon the
purchaser.' Under the Uniform Vendor-Purchaser Risk Act, risk of loss remains
in the seller until the buyer acquires either legal title or possession, and the conthe risk of loss
tract of sale is enforceable against the buyer after he assumes
2
even though the property has been materially destroyed.
A vendor retaining legal title or possession pending payment of the purchase
price is deemed to have an insurable interest in the realty.3 Where the vendor
bears the risk of loss, and he, at his own expense and for his own protection,
has insured the property, he alone is entitled to the proceeds of such insurance. 4
By the contract to sell, a purchaser becomes the equitable owner of the property,
and, whether or not he takes possession of the premises, is deemed to hold an
insurable interest therein.5 Accordingly, where the vendee, for his own interest
and protection, has insured the property, he also may retain the insurance
proceeds."
Where the risk of loss is on the vendee, but the vendor secures a policy of
insurance in his own name and at his own expense, most jurisdictions hold that
the insurance payment received by the vendor is to be applied to a reduction of
the purchase price.7 In Browneit v. Board of Educ.,8 the vendor expressly
assumed the risk of loss and maintained fire insurance at his own expense. The
New York Court of Appeals adopted the strict English rule of Rayner v.
Preston0 and held that insurance is a mere personal contract of indemnity to
protect the interests of the insured and that it does not run with the land. Since
the vendee had an insurable interest, he could, the court said, have protected it
1. Reife v. Osmers, 252 N.Y. 320, 169 N.E. 399 (1929) ; Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N.Y. 168,
90 N.E. 430 (1910).

2. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 240-a 1(b), enacted in 1936. Adopted by California, Michigan,
Oregon, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Hawaii.
3. Wood v. North Western Ins. Co., 46 N.Y. 421 (1871).
4. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (1900) ; Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239
N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).

5.

Brooks v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 76 App. Div. 275, 78 N.Y. Supp. 748 (1902), aff'd, 177

N.Y. 572, 69 N.E. 1120 (1904).

6. Trumbull v. Bombard, 171 App. Div. 700, 157 N.Y. Supp. 794 (3d Dep't 1916).
7. In a New Jersey case plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract to buy and sell
certain realty insured by the vendor in his own name. The court held that the vendee became
the equitable owner and that the vendor, retaining legal title as security for the balance due,
became the trustee holding the insurance proceeds for the vendee as representative of the
property destroyed. Millville Aerie v. Weatherby, 82 N.J. Eq. 455, 88 Atl. 847 (Ch. 1913).
See also Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Adt. 765 (1895); Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S.D.
343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 1324 (1925); 8 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
§ 1937 (1931). Contra, a few jurisdictions hold that even where the vendee bears the risk
of loss, the vendor, who has maintained his own insurance on the property, is entitled to
the proceeds thereof. King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856) ; Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch.
D. 1 (1881), overruled by statute, Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 47.
8. 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925).
9. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881), overruled by statute, Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20,
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by obtaining his own insurance. The court rejected the theory that the vendor
held the proceeds in trust for the vendee, and said that the purchaser was not
entitled to the proceeds of the vendor's policy because it was not a part of the
res bargained for. However, under the Brownell decision, the vendee would not
be liable on the contract because he could assert the defense of impossibility of
performance. The insurer would indemnify the vendor for the loss sustained
and the parties would be in substantially their original position.
It is common to find, as in Rayner v. Preston, the risk of loss on the purchaser and insurance maintained by the vendor in his own name. Because the
court in Brownell unqualifiedly adopted the rule of the Rayner case, that insurance is always a mere personal contract, and made no reference to where the
risk of loss lay, it may be inferred that the court intended that rule to apply in
New York even where the vendee bears the risk of loss. In such a situation the
vendor can enforce the contract and obtain the purchase price. 10 Nevertheless,
this does not entitle him to double compensation. The courts following the
Brownell rule hold that if the seller receives the full purchase price, he suffers
no loss and therefore is entitled to no indemnity. In the event that the insurer
has already paid the proceeds, it has a right of subrogation against the vendee.1
This New York position differs from that in the majority of jurisdictions, which
in such a case hold the insurer liable to the vendor on the policy, and the vendor
in turn holds the indemnity in trust for the purchaser.' 2
The instant case presents a third situation. The majority of the Court of
Appeals here distinguished the Brownell case on the ground that the vendee in
the present case was bound by the terms of the contract to pay for the insurance,
while the vendor in Brownell insured himself at his own cost. Clearly in that
case, the court argued, the insurance was not a part of the res bargained for.
The court pointed out that whether the insurance proceeds in the present case
were held by the vendor as trustee for the purchaser or in some other way,
".... the simple analysis of the situation is that the insurance was taken out
at the cost of the vendee in the name of the vendor
for the protection of the
3
contract and of both parties to the contract."'
The dissent noted that the Brownell court had considered both the trust and
mutual protection theories advanced by the instant court, and had stated:
"These reasons may savor of layman's ideas of equity, but they are not law.
. . . Insurance is a mere personal contract to pay a sum of money by way of
indemnity to protect the interest of the insured."' 4 From this language the
dissent concluded that the Brownell rule should apply to the present facts.15
10. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 240-a.
11. Castesin v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 3S0 (ISS3) which allowed the insurer subrogation in
Rayner v. Preston. See also Fort v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 186 App. Div. 185, 186,
173 N.Y. Supp. 595, 596 (3d Dep't) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 227 N.Y. SS5,125 N.E. 918
(1919); Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 3S5, 3M6 (CL for Corr. of Err. 1836)
(dictum); Lamer v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 127 Misc. 1, 215 N.Y. Supp. 151 (Sup.
CL 1926).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. 3 N.Y.2d at 181, 143 N.E.2d at 920.
14. 239 N.Y. at 374, 146 N.E. at 632.
15. See also Reife v. Osmers, 252 N.Y. 320, 324, 169 N.E. 399, 400 (1929) (dictum);
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The present court did not expressly overrule the Brouell decision, but its
holding raises the question of whether the two cases are reconcilable. It might
reasonably be argued that the vendee's agreement to pay the insurance premiums
was merely a part of the consideration bargained for by the vendor, and was
not intended to benefit the vendee. Under this reasoning, the court in the
present case would clearly be in conflict with the language of the Brownell
decision. On the other hand, the stipulation for payment of the premiums can
reasonably be interpreted as an expression of intent of the parties that the
person bearing the risk of loss should be protected pending the actual closing of
title. It then seems proper to say that such provision should be given that effect
and thus take the case out of the rule set down in the Brownell decision. It was
upon this latter view that the majority of the court based its reasoning, in
effect making the agreement concerning the payment of premiums equivalent to
an assignment of the insurance policy.,
In the absence of any provision concerning insurance in a contract to sell real
property, it is still the rule in New York that insurance is a personal contract.
However, the present decision indicates that the courts might be liberal in
construing agreements concerning the payment of premiums so as to take a case
out of the general rule.
Witnesses - Admissions of Adultery as Confidential Communications
Between Husband and Wife.-Plaintiff wife, alleging abandonment, brought
an action for separation. Defendant husband interposed an affirmative defense
that the wife's cruelty induced and justified his leaving. Defendant testified,
over objection, that plaintiff informed him that she had had illicit relations a
number of times with another man; that they thought they would elope and
go away together; that plaintiff wife moved the defendant's bed out of what
was previously their bedroom and lived apart from him; and that he left his
wife immediately after this. The appellate division affirmed, by a divided court,
the judgment of the supreme court admitting the above testimony and dismissing the complaint. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, two
judges dissenting, affirmed. Admissions of adultery made by one spouse to
another and aimed at destroying the marital relation are not confidential communications. Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 144 N.E.2d 72 (1957).
At common law a husband or wife was absolutely incompetent to testify
when his or her spouse was a party to an action or interested in its outcome.1
This general disqualification 2 has been removed by statute in most jurisdictions, 8
Cowan v. Sutherland, 6 Misc. 2d 71, 117 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (dictum); 1936 N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n Report 767, 776.
16. In the Matter of Pastore's Estate, 155 Misc. 247, 279 N.Y. Supp. 200 (Surr. Ct. 1935);
O'Brien v. Prescott Ins. Co., 11 N.Y. Supp. 125 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
1. McCormick, Evidence § 82 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (3d ed. 1940).
2. See, e.g., note 5 infra, where spouses are not competent to testify to actions founded
on adultery.
3. For a complete and current listing of all statutes see, 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488 (3d
ed. 1940).
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and the privilege from disclosure is now limited to confidential communications.
In New York either spouse is now fully qualified by statute to testify against
the other as to any matters not involving confidential communications, except
in an action founded upon an allegation of adultery.6
The issue in the present action was what constitutes a confidential communication within the meaning of the New York statute.0 It is well settled that to
be privileged the communication must have been made during a valid marriage;
and that a communication, made when the spouses are planning a divorce or
made after a separation or divorce, cannot be privileged. 7 However, those
communications which were confidential when made remain privileged after
the marital status is terminated by death or divorce.8 Conversations made
knowingly in the presence of a third party are presumed not to be confidential
and all present may testify, 9 but where a third party eavesdrops, only he may
testify.' 0 Letters," as well as the observance of acts,'- may also come within
the protection of the statute. Each communication must be taken in conjunction
with the surrounding factual circumstances. For example, where the communi4. The privilege varies with the terms of each statute and the various interpretations by
the courts. Many states have provisions that "any communication" between spouses will be
privileged. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1SS1 (Deering 1949). Other states construe general
terms, e.g., "any communication," "private communications," as applying only to confidential
communications. See, e.g., Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 4S7, 105 N.W. 314 (1905). A third
class of states have express provisions for protection of "confidential communications' only.
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 349.
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 349 provides: "A husband or wife is not competent to testify
against the other, upon the trial of an action ...
founded upon an allegation of adultery,
except to prove the marriage or disprove the allegation of adultery ....
A husband or wife
shall not be compelled, or without the consent of the other if living, allowed to disclose a
confidential communication made by one to the other during marriage." A similar provision,
Pen. Law § 2445, provides that "the husband or wife of a person... accused of a crime
is in all cases a competent witness ... but neither husband nor wife can be compelled to
disclose a confidential communication made . . . during marriage." A spouse may, however,
testify to his own adultery; Rivett v. Rivett, 270 App. Div. 873, 61 N.YS2d 7 (Ist Dep't
1946). For other exceptions to the statute, see Richardson, Evidence § 45S (8th ed. 1955).
6. Since this action is not founded upon an allegation of adultery the sole question is
whether the defendant's testimony was a confidential communication as used in the final
sentence of § 349. See note 5 supra.
7. Yoder v. United States, SO F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1935); Symington v. Symington, 215
App. Div. 553, 214 N.Y. Supp. 307 (Ist Dept. 1926); Spearman v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 449,
152 S.W.915 (1913).
S. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 US. 342 (1897); 3 Vigmore, Evidence § 2341 (3d ed. 1940).
9. People v. Lewis, 62 Hun 622, 16 N.Y. Supp. 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, Gen. T. 1891), aWd,
136 N.Y. 633,32 N.E. 1014 (1892).
10. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 110 Mass. 181 (1872); State v. Wilkens, 72 Ore. 77, 142
Pac. 5S9 (1914).
11. Stillman v. Stillman, 115 Misc. 106, 187 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Sup. CL 1921).

12. Smith v. State, 19S Ind. 156, 152 N.E. S03 (1926); People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194,
S6 NE.2d 172 (1949).
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cations involved ordinary matters of business, 13 a threat to kill someone, 14 or
a dying husband's declaration that he did not commit suicide, 15 the courts have
found the confidential element to be lacking.
The present court stated that a single, all embracing definition would be
impossible to formulate since it is necessary to consider the character of the
communication as well as the relationship of the parties on each occasion. It
argued that the legislature never intended to prevent a persecuted spouse from
testifying to ill treatment. The court's criterion for admissibility is made to
depend upon whether or not the communication constitutes cruel and inhuman
treatment detrimental to the marital relation. The admission in the instant
case was not that of a penitent spouse asking forgiveness, but, on the contrary,
that of an unfaithful wife threatening to persist in her misconduct. In the
court's view, it was therefore necessary to consider the subjective intent of the
declarant as well as the communication itself.
The cases cited by the majority support this reasoning. In Fowler v. Fowler,10
the husband told his wife, on their second night of marriage, that he did not
love her. He also made false admissions of adultery. The court held these
communications to be acts of cruelty and not privileged. In de Meli v. de Mel 1"
unfounded charges of immorality and abusive language were held to be admissible to prove cruelty. In Yax v. Yax,' 8 conversations between husband and
wife regarding the wife's adultery were held to be confidential. However, in
that case, the husband promised to make the wife a joint tenant in real estate
if she would refrain from further adultery, and the present court distinguished
it as a conversation clearly tending to rescue rather than destroy the marital
relation.
The dissent in the present case interpreted the testimony as an example of a
privileged communication protected by the statute. The dissent cited Warner
v. Press PublishingCo.,' 9 an action based on an allegedly libelous publication.
That court refused to admit testimony as to a conversation between the plaintiff
and her husband which might have led to an inference that plaintiff had illicit
relations with another man. However, this conversation was neither offered to
establish cruelty, nor was it shown to be anything but confidential. In Parkhurst
v. Berdell,20 also relied upon by the dissent, the court stated that only those
13. Parkhurst v. Berdell, 110 N.Y. 386, 18 N.E. 123 (1888). But see, Mitchell v. Mitchell,
80 Tex. 101, 15 S.W. 705 (1891), where letters, by a husband to his wife, tending to show that
their business was unprofitable, were inadmissible.
14. People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd,
303 N.Y. 782, 103 N.E.2d 895 (1952).

15. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 272 Fed. 28 (9th Cir. 1921).
16. 58 Hun 601, 11 N.Y. Supp. 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1890). See also Lanyon's
Detective Agency v. Cochrane, 240 N.Y. 274, 148 N.E. 520 (1925), where the court in dictum
said that a wife would be allowed to testify that her husband said he was leaving because
he loved another woman.
17. 120 N.Y. 485, 24 N.E. 996 (1890); Millspaugh v. Potter, 62 App. Div. 521, 71 N.Y.
Supp. 134 (3d Dep't 1901).
18. 125 Misc. 851, 213 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
19. 132 N.Y. 181, 30 N.E. 393 (1892).
20. 110 N.Y. 386, 18 N.E. 123 (1888).
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conversations which are induced by the marital relation are confidential. However, that action was brought to compel an accounting by defendant for certain
money and securities belonging to the plaintiff. The court held that these
conversations were not confidential. Furthermore, the case in no way discussed
the issue of cruelty.
It was further argued by the dissent that the distinction made by the majority
was too subjective, and that an alienated spouse who is a party in a separation
action will be most likely to testify to conversations in such a manner as to
make them admissible. However true this may be, it is obvious that if such
testimony was not false, to disregard it would be to ignore personal wrongs
committed by one spouse against the other.
While the majority opinion is reasonable and consistent with previous decisions, should not the legislature go beyond this? As was pointed out in the
concurring opinion such testimony should be admissible even if confidential. If
not, a spouse maltreated in secrecy could not look to the law for protection. 2
The legislatures and courts of many jurisdictions are not only in accord with
this opinion but go even further by permitting spouses to testify to anything in
a civil action between them, or in a criminal action in which one of them is
charged with a crime against the other.22 In the AIodel Code of Evidence "3 a
similar proposal is made. The major argument advanced in support of the
privilege is that it promotes marital harmony and goodwill.24 Therefore, the
privilege would seem superfluous when spouses oppose each other in civil or
criminal actions, since domestic peace is obviously long gone.
21. 3 N.Y.2d at 318, 144 N.E.2d at 76.
22. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1331 (Deering 1949). At common law, exceptions to
the privilege were also recognized in the case of certain injuries inflicted on one's spoume.
23. Mfodel Code of Evidence rule 216 (1942).
24. Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 227, 24 So. 154, 157 (1S93) ; McCormick, Evidence § 8S
(1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2223 (3d ed. 1940).

